TL;DR

You can download a shortcut here that parses a CSV text and generates multiple passes in batch using MakePass:

Introduction

MakePass is a mighty Apple Wallet pass editor. With it, you can create and customize a myriad of passes with complex layouts, including images, barcodes, colors and text fields. Its most powerful and versatile feature is its integration with the Shortcuts app in iOS, iPadOS and macOS.

MakePass includes multiple Shortcuts actions that allow you to create, preview and share Apple Wallet passes. The Create Pass action exposes all the power of the MakePass pass editor directly in Shortcuts so you can customize all the properties of your pass. The Create Pass action includes an Import Pass File parameter so you can import a template pass file whose properties can be overridden by the action parameters.

Process

First you should create a pass file which will be used as a template. This template file will be set in the Import Pass File parameter of the Create Pass action which uses it as the base canvas over which to override any other parameter. If you do not import a pass file, the Create Pass action will use a blank template by default. You can create your own pass template file in MakePass or use this one as an example.

Afterwards, to create multiple Apple Wallet passes in batch you should import the information which will be inserted in the pass template for each new pass. To do so, we can use the popular CSV (comma-separated values) format:

John Appleseed,CD-0000001,2021-01-01 12:00
Chandler Bing,CD-0000002,2021-01-02 12:00
Mario Gómez,CD-0000003,2021-01-03 12:00
Ursula von Köriet,CD-0000004,2021-01-04 12:00
Alejandro Couñago,CD-0000005,2021-01-05 12:00

In this example CSV document, each line represents a pass that will be generated. Each line includes 3 components that will be added to the pass template (a name in a text field like "John Appleseed", a QR barcode payload like "CD-0000001" and a relevant date like "2021-01-01 12:00"). To load this CSV in Shortcuts, we can use the Text action, load the contents from a file or use the shortcut content input. In this example, we will use the Text action.

Once we have the CSV text loaded in the shortcut, we can split it into lines and iterate over them. In each iteration, we can split the line by commas and extract each of the pass components needed to fill the pass template:

After extracting the components we can simply set our pass template file in the Import Pass File parameter and fill the other custom parameters in the Create Pass action to complete the template:

And voilà! Running the shortcut will generate 5 passes, each one with its own custom properties:

To complete the shortcut, we can add an action to open the passes in macOS or share them with an app in iOS and iPadOS. You can also use the Save File action to store the pass files on your device.

Shortcut

You can get the complete shortcut here.

Apple silicon Macs can run iPhone and iPad apps natively using the same Mac Catalyst technology that powers apps like Twitter or Darkroom on macOS. Although all iOS apps are available by default on the Mac App Store, developers can opt out and make their apps unavailable. Unfortunately, some of the most popular apps, like Instagram, Deliveroo or Netflix, have been removed from the Mac App Store… but that does not mean they cannot run on macOS; they are simply hidden in the Mac App Store. If you have purchased or downloaded any app from the iOS App Store, you have the option to make a backup of it using an IPA file, and those files can be used on Apple silicon Macs to install any iOS app.

Currently, there are multiple approaches to download those IPA files for any iOS app:

• iMobie M1 App Checker.
• Apple Configurator (requires connecting an iPhone or iPad).
• iTunes 12.6 on a compatible Mac or PC.

Once you have the IPA file, you can simply double-click it on any Apple silicon Mac and voilà!

Introduction

While the Home app allows you to read and control your HomeKit-based devices on macOS, iPadOS and iOS, sometimes you want more control. You may want to bridge a sensor to another protocol, expose your home temperature on a public API, or simply export the historical data to a CSV file. Either way, the HomeKit framework is currently a private API on macOS, and it is not available on other platforms like Linux or Windows.

Fortunately, there are some cross-platform implementations of the HomeKit Accessory Protocol that support controller-mode functionality:

• HomeKit Python
• HAP Controller Node

In particular, HomeKit Python supports reading and writing HomeKit characteristics on paired devices as well as generating additional pairings. The main problem is that HomeKit devices typically support only one main pairing controller. Thus, once a device is paired with the Apple Home app, it can only be controlled with the pairing keys managed by the homed system daemon, which are gated by the HomeKit framework.

Fortunately, the HomeKit pairing keys are stored in iCloud Keychain. Unfortunately (but reasonably), the system tries hard to hide these pairing keys. In particular, they neither appear in the Keychain app nor can they be read with the Security framework SecItem* family of APIs without private entitlements granting access to the keychain access group com.apple.hap.pairing.

Process

First of all, we have to subvert the AMFI security model to be able to sign arbitrary executables with private entitlements. To do it, we have to disable System Integrity Protection and AMFI. By rebooting into Recovery OS, we can disable the protections using the Terminal app:

$ csrutil disable
$ nvram boot-args=amfi_get_out_of_my_way=0x1
$ reboot

After reboot, we can use KeychainTool to dump the HomeKit keychain items:

$ git clone https://github.com/pvieito/KeychainKit.git
$ cd KeychainKit
$ cat KeychainTool/KeychainTool.entitlements
# The all-powerful * `keychain-access-groups` entitlement which grants its bearer permission to read all keychain items:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>keychain-access-groups</key>
    <array>
        <string>*</string>
    </array>
</dict>
</plist>

Now we will compile and run KeychainTool to dump all the keychain entries in the com.apple.hap.pairing access group:

$ swift run KeychainTool -g com.apple.hap.pairing
[*] HomeKit Pairing Identity (com.apple.hap.pairing)
[ ] Account: 7C73D188-BF12-4B8C-B7A5-5842D71C24EA
[ ] Key: “21159cfa6032438be197d668b3562e262441965789f95634d6460d4cce5cc706+d2ed8558b369b4ee1fbf4f9eb8d687ee2799aba5608efc2712d8175697bd8ad8”
[*] Paired HomeKit Accessory: CC:0D:07:E4:F7:54 (com.apple.hap.pairing)
[ ] Account: CC:0D:07:E4:F7:54
[ ] Key: “3a4473f1efe5e378fdd329826936f34b674fcb97c8aa5bd9818abde46963f864”
[*] Paired HomeKit Accessory: 58:CA:96:CE:66:5F (com.apple.hap.pairing)
[ ] Account: 58:CA:96:CE:66:5F
[ ] Key: “44d34407d583aee3b12b774a6eb15ee96c527fa83af1db66ac90f60494bbbc29”

Voilà! Here we have all we need:

• The HomeKit Pairing Identity entry contains the pairing identifier stored as the item account name: 7C73D188-BF12-4B8C-B7A5-5842D71C24EA and the LTP and LTS keys required by the HomeKit protocol separated by a + sign on the entry key payload: 21159cfa6032438be197d668b3562e262441965789f95634d6460d4cce5cc706, d2ed8558b369b4ee1fbf4f9eb8d687ee2799aba5608efc2712d8175697bd8ad8
• Each accessory has its own Paired HomeKit Accessory keychain entry containing its pairing key. For example, the device 58:CA:96:CE:66:E9 has the LTP key 44d34407d583aee3b12b774a6eb15ee96c527fa83af1db66ac90f60494bbbc29.

Now we can use the pairing keys to set up HomeKit Python on any device and platform:

$ python3 -m pip install "homekit[IP]" --user
$ python3 -m homekit.discover
# `homekit_python` will list all HomeKit devices found on the network:
Name: Eve Extend XXXX._hap._tcp.local.
Url: http_impl://192.168.0.123:8080
Configuration number (c#): 5
Feature Flags (ff): Supports HAP Pairing (Flag: 1)
Device ID (id): 58:CA:96:CE:66:5F  # Same Device ID as in the keychain entry.
Model Name (md): Eve Extend XXXXXXXX
Protocol Version (pv): 1.1
State Number (s#): 1
Status Flags (sf): Accessory has been paired. (Flag: 0)
Category Identifier (ci): Bridge (Id: 2)
$ mkdir ~/.homekit_python
$ python3 -m homekit.init_controller_storage -f ~/.homekit_python/pairing.json
$ nano ~/.homekit_python/pairing.json
# Write the pairing credentials for each device:
{
  "EveExtend": {
    "AccessoryPairingID": "58:CA:96:CE:66:E9",
    "AccessoryLTPK": "44d34407d583aee3b12b774a6eb15ee96c527fa83af1db66ac90f60494bbbc29",
    "iOSPairingId": "7C73D188-BF12-4B8C-B7A5-5842D71C24EA",
    "iOSDeviceLTSK": "d2ed8558b369b4ee1fbf4f9eb8d687ee2799aba5608efc2712d8175697bd8ad8",
    "iOSDeviceLTPK": "21159cfa6032438be197d668b3562e262441965789f95634d6460d4cce5cc706",
    "AccessoryIP": "192.168.0.123",
    "AccessoryPort": 8080,
    "Connection": "IP"
  }
}
$ python3 -m homekit.identify -f ~/.homekit_python/pairing.json -a EveExtend
# The HomeKit device should identify itself (for example, by blinking an LED).
$ python3 -m homekit.get_accessories -f ~/.homekit_python/pairing.json -a EveExtend
# Shows all the accessories exposed by the device.
$ python3 -m homekit.get_characteristic -f ~/.homekit_python/pairing.json -a EveExtend -c 3.38
# Shows the value of a given characteristic, for example the room relative humidity:
{
    "3.38": {
        "value": 54.4525146484375
    }
}

Finally, remember to re-enable System Integrity Protection and reboot your Mac:

$ csrutil clear

Introduction

Entitlements are an important part of Apple’s security architecture. They allow Apple to restrict OS features to Apple-approved processes. Nowadays, even with System Integrity Protection disabled, the AMFI kernel extension and the amfid process will always kill at launch any process that has restricted entitlements but is not signed by Apple or does not have a properly approved embedded provisioning profile.

Unrestricted entitlements are available to all signed binaries, even ad hoc (some examples are the sandbox entitlements com.apple.security.* or the application identifier entitlement com.apple.application-identifier), but they do not give the process any special capability. On the contrary, they limit its reach.

To allow any entitlements, even the more interesting restricted ones, for a Developer ID-signed binary, we have to modify the amfid process (to allow ad hoc signatures too, we would have to patch the AMFI kernel extension or its underlying dependencies, which I didn’t try).

Process

To patch a system daemon, we have to disable macOS System Integrity Protection. After some reverse engineering, it seems one of the main decisions in the amfid flow is at address offset 0x347D.

Knowing that we can change the following two instructions from:

test %r14, %r14
je loc_100003531

To this:

mov %r14, %r15
jno loc_100003531

This way, the flow will always jump to loc_100003531 and %r14 will become null (%r15 is always null at this point), so every Developer ID-signed process will be validated even without a provisioning profile allowing its entitlements.

Code

To achieve this modification, we can go the hard way by modifying the binary in situ (it is located at /usr/libexec/amfid) or the soft way: patching amfid memory at runtime. I preferred the second option so I could restart the unpatched amfid code by simply killing it.

To do it, I ported to Python 3 a wrapper for Mach VM APIs called pymach and added a new function to get the ASLR slice offset of the process: PyMach for Python 3. With that, I wrote this script for macOS 10.12.2. To use it, simply run:

$ sudo ./amfid_patch.py

And answer yes when asked if you want to patch the process. Voilà! Now any Developer ID-signed binaries will be executed even with restricted entitlements.

You can set any entitlement you want, like com.apple.developer.icloud-container-identifiers or com.apple.private.appleaccount.app-hidden-from-icloud-settings, with an arbitrary iCloud container. For a complete list of private entitlements used by Apple, you can go to Jonathan Levin’s Entitlements Database.

References

• *OS Internals: Volume III